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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JACK. F. SCHERBEL

:
Plaintiff-Appellant :

vs.

Case No. 19633

:

SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION
ET AL.
Defendant-Respondents :

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Plaintiff-Appellant appeals the judgment of the Third
Judicial Court of the State of Utah, dated October 25, 1983, denying plaintiff any relief and dismissing the plaintifffs complaint.

DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT
The Lower Court denied Plaintiff's request for relief,
ruled that the decision of the

Salt Lake City Council was not

arbitrary or capricious nor did it exceed the Council's authori-1-
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ty; that the terms and provisions of Section 51-32-8 (3) of the
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, relating to visual compatability were not unconstitutionally vague; that Section 51-14A-1
of the Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City were not invalid nor
unconstitutional; that the action of the City Council in City Ordinance No. 10 of 1980, downzoning the area of Plaintifffs proposed construction to a residential "R-2H" classification was not
invalid; and that Plaintiff was not entitled to build his proposed construction project and had no vested right to do so.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-appellant seeks to have the Judgment of the
Lower Court reversed and set aside and a ruling by this Honorable
Court that Plaintiff-appellant had acquired a vested right to
construct his proposed project as approved by the Planning and
Zoning Commission of Salt Lake City Corporation (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 39) that the "appeal" to the City Council was invalid
and that the remedy of a proper "agrieved" party was to ask for a
review of the ruling of the Planning and Zoning Commission by the
District Court which could only rule on the question of whether
or not the said commission had acted arbitrarily and capriciously
and contrary to law in approving the application of Plaintiffappellant.

-2-
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-appellant is the owner of real property on
the southeast corner of Second Avenue and "E" Street in Salt Lake
City, Utah, which property has been in the family for approximately 80 years (with an option to purchase an adjoining piece of
property), comprising approximately 1/2 acre.

As early as May of

1973, Plaintiff-appellant began petitioning Salt Lake City for approval to construct a multiple housing unit on his property at
above location and continued each year thereafter to propose to
the City Planning and Zoning Commission various plans for the
construction of multiple housing units on his said property (Defendants' Exhibits 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32).
In the time period, related above, the City established
an Historic District in the City's avenue area and required submission of any proposed new construction to the Historic Landmark
Committee for its study and recommendation after an application
had been filed with the Planning and Zoning Commission for new
construction.

The Planning and Zoning Commission, however, was

not required to follow the recommendation of the Historic
Landmark Committee and could approve an application regardless of
said committee's recommendation to the contrary.
Plaintiff-appellant filed an application for a building
permit, dated June 19, 1977, for construction of a nursing home
and rehabilitation center (Defendants1 Exhibit 33). Due to prob-3-
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lems encountered, this application was abandoned and Plaintiffappellant on October 24, 1979f filed a new application for a
building permit to construct a 35 unit condominium project on his
said property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 and Exhibit 3).
At about the same time, the Greater Avenues Community
Council, hereinafter referred to as GACC, filed petition No, 579
with the City, requesting downzoning of an area in the avenues
which encompassed the property of Plaintiff-appellant (Defendant's Exhibit 34) .
On November 6, 1979, the Historical Landmark Committee
met to discuss and study the application of Plaintiff-appellant.
This committee voted to recommend against its approval, objecting
to the density and height of the proposed construction (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2-P —

see also Plaintiff's Exhibit 4-P).

On January 10, 1980, the Planning and Zoning Commission, at the request of the Plaintiff-appellant, considered the
application of Mr. Scherbel and, even though the Historical
Landmark Committee had recommended against the proposed project,
in a five to three vote the Planning and Zoning Commission approved the proposed plans (Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 39) as being
"compatible with the neighborhood" and then "ORDERED that the request for a permit to build a 35 unit condominium project on the
southeast corner of "E" Street and Second Avenue within a Historic District BE GRANTED and the Building Inspector be
-4-
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authorized to issue the required permitsn (Plaintiff's Exhibit 3P and 4-P).
Immediately thereafter (on the same day, in fact, that
the Planning and Zoning Commission had approved the Plaintiff's
application to construct the 35 unit condominium as shown on
Plaintiff's submitted plans [Plaintifffs Exhibit No. 39]), the
said Greater Avenues Community Council (GACC), an ad hoc organization of citizens, wrote a letter to Mayor Ted Wilson, purporting to "appeal" to a "higher authority" the decision of the
Planning and Zoning Commission (Plaintiff's Exhibit 6-P).
On February 19, 1980, Mayor Ted Wilson issued Executive
Order No. 2^ purporting to grant the "appeal" of the GACC by purporting also to grant to the City Council (a legislative body of
the council form of government) authority to hear the "appeal."
The directive purported to grant to this legislative body the
following authority:

"Said Council after a review of the testi-

mony presented before it by a vote of at least four members of
said council, may affirm, reverse or modify the decision of the
Planning Commission."
Almost simultaneously with the issuance of Executive
Order No. 2 by Mayor Wilson (the same day) the hearing took
place, beginning on February 19th and continuing to February 20th
of 1980 (Defendants' Exhibit 24-D).
The "appeal" was heard, over the objections of the
-5-
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Plaintiff-appellant by the entire City Council, the legislative
branch of city government, in the form of a Hde novo" proceeding
and the "agrieved parties" who requested the hearing were
referred to as Mr. Justin Stewart and the GACC.

There is no re-

cord that any sworn testimony was, in fact, presented with crossexamination of any witnesses.

The Findings of Fact and Conclu-

sions of Law and Order, reversing the Planning and Zoning Commission's approval of Plaintiff's proposed project were signed and
entered on the 11th day of March 1980 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 13- P
and 15-P and Defendants' Exhibit 24-D).
To further frustrate Plaintiff's attempts to improve
his property, the area in which Plaintiff's property is situated
was downzoned from an R-6 to an R-2H classification on January
29, 1980 (Plaintiff's Exhibits 9-P, 10-P, 11-P).
Thereafter Plaintiff filed his action in the District
Court of Salt Lake County, which Court rendered a decision denying him relief and upholding the procedures of allowing the City Council to hear de novo the matter of approval of Plaintiff's
proposed plans (Plaintiff's Exhibit 39) and further upholding the
procedure of allowing the political decision of the legislative
body of the city to be substituted for the expert judgment of the
Planning and Zoning Commission.

-6-
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POINT I
PLAINTIFF HAS A VESTED RIGHT TO PROCEED
WITH THE BUILDING PROJECT AS APPROVED
BY THE PLANNING AND ZONING COMMISSION

The creation of the Historical Landmark Committee, an
ad hoc organization and its function, seems to have caused some
confusion in the minds of some of the city officials.

His-

torically, the Planning and Zoning Commission has been composed
of well-informed persons carefully chosen, whose duty it is to
carefully scrutinize all proposed construction plans prepared in
sufficient detail and to scale, showing the actual dimensions of
the lot to be built upon, the size and location of buildings to
be erected, showing elevations, set-backs, etc. to determine that
the plans meet all requirements as to zoning.

Well-meaning citi-

zens in their efforts to preserve for future posterity those
structures deemed by them to be of historical value, have
attempted to superimpose upon the Planning and Zoning Commission,
an advisory committee which in Salt Lake City is known as the
Historical Landmarks Committees (HLC).

Actually, the HLC is no

more than an advisory group which the Planning and Zoning Commission may or may not heed.
Certainly, it was never intended that the recommendation of HLC was a mandate to the Planning and Zoning Commission,
-7Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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although in the instant case little consideration, by either the
lower court or the city fathers, was given to the fact that the
Planning and Zoning Commission is the appointed body of the city
to carefully study an application to construct a new building or
buildings and after careful consideration to either approve or
deny the application.

The only limitation on the power and

authority of the Planning and Zoning Commission in an Historic
Landmark area is that the application cannot be approved until
the HLC has also studied the application and taken a position of
either recommending approval or denial.
The recommended denial, however, seems in the instant
case to have been interpreted to mean that the Planning and Zoning Commission acted contrary to law when it gave its approval
to the Scherbel application and that some action had to be taken
to whip this Commission into paying absolute attention to the
HLC's recommendation, as though it were a mandate.
The language of Sec. 51-32-6, Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City, specifically grants to the Planning and Zoning
Commission "power to approve or deny issuing [a building] permit."

It was pursuant to this ordinance that Plaintiff-appellant

on October 24, 1979, submitted his application to the Planning
and Zoning Commission for a building permit to allow construction
of his proposed project.
Section 51-32-7, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City
-8-
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states:
Planning shall approve or deny such an application
within five months of receipt of the application. If
Planning approves the application, the application
shall be processed in the same manner as all other applications for building or demolition permits. If the
committee disapproves the application, the commmittee
shall state its reasons in writing and a permit shall
not be issued at that time. The foregoing to the contrary, notwithstanding unless the owner of the property
agrees to an extension of time beyond said five months
or unless means acceptable to the owner have been found
to preserve the structure, or eminent domain proceedings have commenced, Planning shall, upon the passage of five months from the date of application provided the work proposed to be done meets all other requirements of city and state law for issuance of such a
permit.
After the approval by the Planning and Zoning Commission the various permits necessary for the project's execution,
such as demolition permit, building permit after final detailed
architectural plans had been prepared were purely ministerial
and, but for the so-called appeal and subsequent unlawful intervening action of the legislative body of the city government,
there would have been no problem.
If, therefore, this court rules that the action of the
City Council was ultra vires under the city's strong mayor-council form of government and allows the decision of the Planning
and Zoning Commission to stand, it follows that the City must issue the building permits or proceed under eminent domain to acquire the property and pay Mr. Scherbel its fair market value.
This court a few years ago had cause to study carefully
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the separation of powers under the mayor-council form of
government in the case of Martindale, et al. vs. Anderson, et al.
581 P2 1022.

This Court ruled in that case that the Utah Legis-

lature provided "for a complete separation of executive and
legislative powers, the former being lodged exclusively in the
mayor and the latter in the council."

This Court went on to

state that this is so because the Act is patterned after the absolute separation of powers doctrine set forth in the federal and
state constitutions."

This Court went on further (p. 1027) to

state:
On the other hand, we cannot agree with the
conclusion that the executive powers of the
minicipality are to be in some way shared.
When the Act is read in its entirety, and each
provision thereof is read in context with all the
others, and when viewed in the light of the legislative
history of municipal government in Utah, we are compelled to conclude that it in fact provides for the absolute separtion of executive and legislative powers
(emphasis added).
There can be no doubt but that the Planning and Zoning
Commission exercises an executive function of city government and
that the City Council is strictly the legislative body of the city.

How, then, can the separation of powers be carried out if

the Mayor can by an Executive Order delegate to the legislative
body a function which is in no way a legislative one?

If the

City needs to clarify an ambiguity or anachronism in its ordinances, relating to the proper procedures to be followed to overrule or set aside the decision of the Planning and Zoning
-10-
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Commission, it should do so in the proper manner, namely by means
of the City Council enacting a proper ordinance to set forth the
procedures to be followed, either by means of appeal to an administrative appellate body or to a court of law.

To allow the

Mayor to delegate to the legislative body what is either an
executive (administrative) appeal or a judicial appeal defeats
the very purpose of the Act and would thereby frustrate the Legislative intent in providing for an absolute separation of executive and legislative powers.
In view of the foregoing statements of the law it was
error for the lower court to ignore this Court's ruling in the
Martindale Case (supra) and, by denying the Plaintiff the relief
requested, thereby approve the action of the Mayor and the City
Council.
At no time did the Planning and Zoning Commission disapprove the application unless the "order" of the City Council
could be deemed such disapproval, which in light of the Martindale case (supra) it could not;

it, therefore, follows that pur-

suant to the provisions of Sec 51-32-7, Revised Ordinances of
Salt Lake City (supra), the Plaintiff-appellant was entitled to
the issuance of the building permit as of March 24, 1980 (five
months after the application was filed).
This case is not entirely unique in the methods used to
block and frustrate the Plaintiff-appellant.

In the case of

-11Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Smith vs M. Spiegel and Sons Oil Corporation, Inc., 31 A.D. 2nd
d
819, 298 N.Y.S.2 47 (1969) affirmed 24 NYS 2d984 (1969), Smith
applied for a building permit in October of 1967 to construct a
service station.

Later that month, neighborhood civic organiza-

tions and other residents initiated legal action to prohibit the
issuance of the permit.

While the legal action was pending the

city rezoned the area so that service stations were prohibited.
In discussing whether the applicant had a vested right to the
building permit, the court stated:
The are two rules to be applied in determining
whether a party has acquired vested rights to a building permit prior* to a zoning resolution amendment
which would prohibit such use. The first, which applies where no permit has been issued, is that the party is entitled to the permit when the public officials
in question willfully withhold and refuse to issue the
permit and, in addition, mislead and hinder him, to the
end that if they had acted with reasonable promptness
his permit would have been granted and he could have
conducted the business in question and thereby have acquired a vested right prior to the zoning amendment.
The second, which applies where a permit has been issued, is that vested rights are acquired where the
property owner has commenced work of a substantial
character on the property prior to the amendment. 298
N.Y.S. 2d at 49 [Citations omitted; emphasis added].
This rule was recently applied in Pcirkridge vs. City of
Seattle, 89 Wash. 2nd 454, 573 P.2d 359 (1978), a case remarkably
similar to the instant case.

In 1966 and 1967, Parkridge pur-

chased certain lots for the purpose of constructing apartments.
In 1973, when they applied for a demolition permit, someone in
the city's Building Department notified a community council of
-12-
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the demolition application.

This group thereupon contacted the

superintendant of the Building Department demanding that the environmental impact statement be required before the issuance of a
permit.

The city complied.

Within a month, the group filed a

petition to re-zone the area in which the Parkridge lots were located so that apartments could not be built.

Subsequently,

Parkridge applied for a building permit to construct a 60 unit
apartment.

The city then re-zoned the area as petitioned.

Meanwhile, the Building Department required Parkridge
to provide a complete environmental asssessment report on the
proposed building project and sent Parkridge a form letter notifying them that no action would be taken on their building application for six months.

In response, Parkridge1s architect began

meeting with a representative of the Building Department.

As a

result of those discussions, Parkridge modified its plans by reducing its building from 60 to 50 units.

The architect continued

to meet with Building Department and Traffic Engineer personnel.
After about six months, the Building Department informed
Parkrdige that under the Building Code, the time for acting on
its application had expired and in January 1975, informed Parkridge that no further action of the building permit would be
taken.

Thereupon, Parkridge filed a lawsuit, demanding the is-

suance of a building permit.

The trial court determined that

Parkridge had a vested right to a building permit.
-13Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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In dealing with the vested rights claim of Parkridge,
the Washington Supreme Court agreed that Parkridge was diligent
in its efforts to obtain a building permit and that Parkridge was
frustrated by the City's actions.

On this basis, the trial

court's decision that Parkridge had a vested right to the permit
was affirmed.
In the Parkridge case (supra) it was argued that the
applicant could not have acquired a vested right since he did not
ever submit final plans.
necessary.

The court ruled that this was not

In the instant case it would have availed Mr. Scher-

bel nothing.

The City Council, by its ultra vires act had or-

dered that no permit be issued and that the Building Department
refused to issue any permit without a directive from the Planning
and Zoning Commission and that body, although it had previously
approved the application, after the political machinations of the
City Council, it took no further action.

Performance of a use-

less act was not required with its attendant architectural expense.

POINT II
THE CITY COUNCIL HAD NO AUTHORITY TO HEAR
THE GREATER AVENUE COMMUNITY COUNCIL APPEAL
The day after the Planning and Zoning Commission
-14-
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authorized the Building Inspector to issue the required permits,
the Greater Avenues Community Council appealed the decision to
"the higher authority" by addressing a letter to Mayor Wilson.
On February 20, 1980, the City Council heard the appeal, reversed
the Planning and Zoning Commission's decision and ordered that no
building permits be issued.
The City Council's claimed authority to hear the appeal
was based upon Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake
City, and/or Executive Order No. 2 (February 19, 1980).

The

Ordinance and/or Executive Order could not give the City Council
authority to hear the appeal.
Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City
provided that "any decision of Planning may [be] appeal[ed] to
the Board of City Commissioners."

At the time the appeal was

made, the Board of City Commissioners had been dissolved.

Since

authority for any appeal must be based upon a statute or
ordinance, and since Section 51-32-11 was not amended to give the
City Council authority to hear an appeal, the City Council had
no authority to hear it under this provision.
The underlying principle here is illustrated by the
procedure used to replace the City Courts with Circuit Courts in
1978.

When the State Legislature abolished the City Courts, it

recognized that those matters over which the City Courts had
jurisdiction would not automatically be within the jurisdiction
-15-
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of the new circuit Courts.

For this reason, Utah Code Annotated

Section 78-4-32 was enacted giving the Circuit Courts jurisdiction over matters which would otherwise be lost when the City
Courts were dissolved.

If the City Council was to have the jur-

isdiction of the Board of City Commissioners, an ordinance to
that effect should have been enacted.

Because of the fundamental

change in the organization of the City's government, however, it
is obvious why it was not possible for such ordinances to be
enacted.
Standing alone, the Executive Order conferring
authority upon the City Council to hear the appeal is an ex post
facto creation of a right of appeal in derogation of Mr. Scherbel ' s rights and is therefore void.

In addition, the Mayor had

no authority to create such an appeal.
Furthermore, the City Council ordered that no building
permits be issued.

As stated in Section 10-3-1217, the City

Council "shall not give orders" to any subordinate of the Mayor.
The permit office is subordinate to the Mayor.

Applying the

statute literally, each council member concurring in the order
may be required to forfeit his or her office.
In light of the above, the appeal to the City Council
was improper.

By granting the appeal and deciding adversely to

Mr. Scherbel, the City has prevented Mr. Scherbel from obtaining
his building permit.
-16-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

POINT III
THE GREATER AVENUES COMMUNITY COUNCIL,
A SPECIAL INTEREST GROUP, DID NOT
HAVE STANDING TO "APPEAL"

The ordinance on which the Mayor and the Council relied in
"granting the appeal" of the GACC states: "Any person agrieved by
any decision of planning may appeal that decision to the Board of
Commissioners".
Lake City.

Section 51-32-11, Revised Ordinances of Salt

An "agrieved person," according to Black, is "one who

has suffered a denial of some personal or property right."

The

grievance must be based on some direct and tangible personal or
property right which is adversely affected.

There was no showing

that GACC had any grievance, except that those who composed the
group politically took exception to the ruling of the Planning
and Zoning Commission and induced the Mayor to refer the "appeal"
to the City Council for a political decision harmonious with
their ideas of what should and what should not be built in the
general area of the avenues of Salt Lake City.

Certainly, if

GACC was qualified as an "agrieved person," it is respectfully
submitted that city government could not function as a result of
the political interferences (appeals) of special interest groups
from decisions of the city's various executive bodies, boards and
commissions.
-17-
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POINT IV
THE FINDINGS OF COURT AS TO THE SUFFICIENCY
OF PLANS FOR PLANNING AND ZONING REVIEW
IS CONTRARY TO THE EVIDENCE
Plaintiff's Exhibit 39-P, introduced and accepted as
evidence, clearly speaks for itself.

It is a detailed plan,

showing the property to be improved and the set-back, elevations
and all other details required to be set forth in order to obtain
a building permit.

To rule to the contrary would be tantamount

to saying that the Planning and Zoning Commission was incompetent
and incapable of knowing what were and what were not plans sufficient in detail to obtain the initial necessary green light for
the proposed project.

It is common knowledge that a developer

does not spend large sums of money on the final and complete architectural plans prior to getting threshold approval for the
project from the Planning and Zoning authority.

Nowhere does the

lower court find that the commission was incompetent, but by
stating in the Findings of Fact No. 37 (p. 9) that the
"preliminary plans lacked the detail required to complete a required review for zoning compliance" where such plans had, in
fact, been submitted, reviewed by the Commission and approved
over the objection of the HLC, the message could not be clearer.
The fact is, the preliminary plans (Plaintiff's Exhibit 39) were
in sufficient detail and it was error for the lower court to sub-18-
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stitute its judgment for that of the experts sitting on the Commission.
CONCLUSION
The approval by the Salt Lake City Planning and Zoning Commission of the plans submitted by the Plaintiff-appellant gave a
vested right to a building permit to improve the property on the
Southeast corner of Second Avenue and "E" Street as set forth in
the plans (Plaintiff's Exhibit 39) and the lower court erred in
denying to Plaintiff-appellant the relief prayed for in his complaint.

This court, therefore, should on the basis of the record

and the law, set aside the ruling of the lower court and remand
the case with instructions to the lower court to require the city
to forthwith issue the building permit as approved by the City
Planning and Zoning Commission on January 10, 1980.
Dated this /^P^Z

of June, 1984.

RespeCT^ully submitted,

I^EON A. HALGREI^
>rney for Che Plaintiffappellant

-19-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MAILING CERTIFICATE
This is to certify that I mailed two true and exact
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